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ABSTRACT
To save time and money, businesses and individuals have be-
gun outsourcing their data and computations to cloud com-
puting services. These entities would, however, like to ensure
that the queries they request from the cloud services are be-
ing computed correctly. In this paper, we use the principles
of economics and competition to vastly reduce the complex-
ity of query verification on outsourced data. We consider
two cases: First, we consider the scenario where multiple
non-colluding data outsourcing services exist, and then we
consider the case where only a single outsourcing service ex-
ists. Using a game theoretic model, we show that given the
proper incentive structure, we can effectively deter dishonest
behavior on the part of the data outsourcing services with
very few computational and monetary resources. We prove
that the incentive for an outsourcing service to cheat can
be reduced to zero. Finally, we show that a simple verifi-
cation method can achieve this reduction through extensive
experimental evaluation.
Keywords
game theory, data outsourcing, contracts, query verification
1. INTRODUCTION
As the amount of data that we generate increases, so does
the time and effort necessary to process and store the data.
With an increase in time and effort comes an increase in
monetary cost. To this end, many have turned to outsourc-
ing their data processing to “the cloud.” Cloud computing
services are offered by many large companies, such as Ama-
zon, IBM, Microsoft, and Google, as well as smaller com-
panies such as Joyent and CSC. For example, Google [7]
recently launched the Google BigQuery Service, which is de-
signed for exactly this purpose: outsourced data processing.
The distributed nature of these cloud services shortens data
processing time significantly, and offers a massive amount of
storage.
Figure 1: Data Outsourcing with Verification
In a perfect world, these cloud providers would impartially
devote all the computation necessary to any task paid for
by the subscribers. In such a world, the querying process
would look like figure 1 (minus the verifier), where the sub-
scriber outsources the data D to the cloud, and sends queries
(Q), and the cloud does the necessary calculations and re-
turns the result (Q(D)). However, a cloud provider is a
self-interested entity. Since it is very difficult for the users
of the cloud to see the inner workings of the cloud service,
a cloud provider could “cut corners,” delivering a less ac-
curate or incomplete computation result which would take
fewer system resources to compute. This would, of course,
save computational resources for the provider, provided the
subscriber was unable to tell a false result from a true one.
Because of this, query verification, or the assurance of query
result correctness, has been identified as one of the major
problems in data outsourcing [17].
Many techniques have been developed and employed for
query verification. Query verification is the process of verify-
ing the authenticity of an outsourced query result. In figure
1 above, the subscriber sends a query to the outsourcing
service, and receives a response. Query verification would
then be another process where the subscriber determines if
the response is, in fact, the result of the query. The ver-
ification process may belong to the owner, or it may be
another process entirely. In any case, the verifier aims to
make sure that the outsourced server responded correctly.
These verification techniques range from simple to extremely
complex, and generally rely on the subscriber storing some
sketch of the data (much smaller in size), or some cryp-
tographic protocols. Such protocols do a good job verifying
the data, but are often slow, or only work with specific types
of queries. Many of them require that the subscriber know
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which queries he will execute in advance, so that a sketch can
be created for each one. None of these, however, consider
the heart of the problem: the self-interest of the parties.
The problem of data outsourcing, and the resultant query
verification, is fundamentally a problem of incentives. A
cloud subscriber wants to get the result of his queries ac-
curately and efficiently, with as low a cost as possible. A
cloud provider, however, is most concerned about the prof-
itable use of its computing resources. These incentives can
be at odds with each other. The natural way of analyzing
competing incentives is to use game theory.
Game theory is a branch of economics which studies com-
petitive behavior between parties. An interaction between
parties is cast as a game, where players use strategy to max-
imize their gains. The gains from an interaction can be
offset artificially by contracts, enforced by law. These ad-
justments can make actions which were once profitable, i.e.,
“cutting corners” in a calculation, less profitable through the
use of penalties. The contracts, therefore, aim not to detect
whether a cloud provider is cheating, but to remove the in-
centive for the provider to cheat altogether.
We propose a game theory-based approach to query verifica-
tion on outsourced data. We model the process of querying
outsourced data as a game, with contracts used to enforce
behavior. Data outsourcing does not take place in a vac-
uum. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) exist for all types
of cloud services[14], and are enforceable contracts in court.
Thus, we can augment the SLA with an incentive structure
to encourage honest behavior. Using a very simple query
verification technique, we show that even the threat of ver-
ification is enough to deter cheating by a cloud provider.
First, we consider the case where multiple, non-colluding
cloud providers exist. Non-colluding means that the cloud
providers do not share information. We feel this is realistic,
since cloud providers are competing entities and do not wish
to share data with the competition. In this scenario, we
show that without the use of special verification techniques,
a data owner can guarantee correct results from rational
cloud providers, while incurring an additional cost that is
only a small fraction of the overall computation cost.
We also consider the case where only a single cloud provider
is used. A data owner may wish to use only a single cloud
provider to save money, as they may not have the money to
hire multiple cloud services. In addition, a data owner may
simply wish to minimize the outside exposure of the data.
We choose to demonstrate our approach using the simple
random sampling query verification technique. This tech-
nique was rejected in many works before, because it required
a relatively large storage overhead to achieve a close bound
on the sample result. For our approach, we do not need in-
credibly close bounds on the result. We only need bounds
close enough to catch some mistakes. The simple random
sampling technique also has the added bonus that it can be
used to verify many different types of queries, including any
aggregates which can be estimated from a sample (count,
sum, average, standard deviation, median, quantiles, max,
min, etc), and also estimate the size of selection queries, al-
lowing for some verification on those queries as well. Finally,
our method requires running the verification on only a frac-
tion of the queries, incurring a much lower expected runtime
than a full sample-based verification method.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We develop a game theoretic model of query verifica-
tion on outsourced data.
• For both the multiple non-colluding cloud case and
the single cloud case, we show that the model has an
equilibrium where the cloud provider behaves honestly.
• We show that a simple sampling technique, although
rejected by other works, becomes practical in our single
cloud setting.
• Through extensive experimentation, we show that use
of this simple sampling method, coupled with our in-
centive structure, deters cheating in practice.
• Finally, we show that our incentives can improve the
expected runtime of any query verification method,
making it extremely flexible.
Our paper does not consider the privacy of the outsourced
data (similar to [3]). However, any privacy-preserving tech-
nique for outsourcing data could still be used in our frame-
work. The use of our game theoretic techniques will not
affect the privacy-preserving properties of such schemes.
2. RELATEDWORK
Several scholarly works have outlined query verification meth-
ods. The vast majority of these works focus on specific types
of queries. Some focus only on selection [2, 4, 10, 18, 20],
while others focus on relational queries such as selection,
projection, and joins [13, 12]. Still others focus only on ag-
gregation queries like sum, count, and average [8, 19, 21].
Some of these processes [16, 21] require different verifica-
tion schemes for each type of query, or even each individual
query, requiring that the subscriber knows which queries will
be asked in advance.
Many of the schemes require complex cryptographic proto-
cols. Some encrypt the data itself, relying on homomorphic
schemes to allow the cloud provider to perform the compu-
tation [6, 19]. A homomorphic operation will always be less
efficient than the operation on the plaintext, rendering the
overhead of these protocols greater by orders of magnitude.
Others, such as [16], rely on relatively simpler cryptographic
primitives, like secure hash functions. To maintain integrity,
our scheme will also use hash functions. Our verification
framework is, however, simpler than these, and can be used
to improve the expected runtime of any of these verification
schemes.
The work of Canetti, Riva, and Rothblum [3] also makes
use of multiple outsourcing services for query verification.
However, they make use of all the services all the time, and
require a logarithmic number of rounds to ensure verifiabil-
ity of computation. In addition, they assume that at least
one of the cloud providers is in fact honest. We, in contrast,
do not assume that any provider is honest, merely that they
A→
B↓ X Y
X 1,0 0,1
X 0,1 1,0
Figure 2: A simple game with a mixed strategy equi-
librium
are rational (meaning that the provider wishes to maximize
his profits), and we only use additional providers a fraction
of the time. In addition, we only require one round of com-
putation.
3. BACKGROUND
Before delving into the depths of outsourced query verifi-
cation, some background knowledge is necessary. We will
require some basic knowledge of game theory. In addition,
we will be making use of some basic cryptographic primitives
to ensure data integrity.
3.1 Game Theory
Game theory, despite the misleading name, is a widely ac-
cepted field of economic theory which studies competitive
behavior. Competing parties are known as players, and the
competition itself is known as a game. A game contains
four basic elements: players, actions, payoffs, and informa-
tion [15]. Players have actions which they can perform at
designated times in the game, and as a result of the ac-
tions in the game, players receive payoffs. The payoffs are
represented as real-valued functions which depend on the
actions chosen and the information surrounding the game.
The players can have different pieces of information, which
can have a tremendous impact on the outcome of the game.
The players aim to use a profitable strategy to increase their
payout. A player who acts in such a way as to maximize
his or her payout, regardless of the effects on other play-
ers, is called rational. Games take many forms, and vary
in the four attributes mentioned above, but all games deal
with them. The specific games we describe in this paper
are finite player, two-step, incomplete information Bayesian
games, with payouts based on the final result of players’
actions.
A game is said to be at equilibrium when no single player can
unilaterally increase his or her payoff by changing his or her
strategy. In such a scenario, no players have any incentive
to choose a different strategy. It was shown by Nash [11]
that all finite player games have an equilibrium, although
the equilibrium might require mixed strategies. A mixed
strategy is a strategy in which players choose each of the
available actions with a certain probability. For example,
consider the game with two players, A and B. During the
game, the players can choose either action X or action Y,
and both players choose their actions simultaneously. If both
players choose the same action, player A recieves a utility of
1, while player B recieves a utility of 0. Otherwise, player
B recieves a utility of 1, and player A recieves a utility of 0.
This game can be represented by the table in figure 1.
Suppose player A’s strategy is to always choose action X.
Player B could then choose his action to be Y, and guar-
antee himself a payout of 1. However, if this was the case,
then player A could simply alter his strategy to choose ac-
tion Y, thwarting player B’s strategy. Suppose, however,
that player A’s strategy is to flip a fair coin, choose X if it
comes up heads, and tails if it comes up Y. In this scenario,
no matter what player B chooses, player B’s expected pay-
out is 1
2
. Player B can also choose to use this strategy. If
both players use this strategy, then the game is in equlib-
rium, since neither player has any incentive to unilaterally
change strategy. This equilibrium is the only equilibrium
of the game, and since the strategies are probabilistic, the
equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
We can also frame the above game as a game with a pure
strategy equilibrium, but with continuous actions. Instead
of having the actions be X and Y , we allow each player to
select, as his action, a probability between zero and one that
they would select X. Let the probability that A chooses X
be α, and the probability that B chooses X be β. As before,
the equilibrium is α = β = 1
2
. However, this equilibrium is
in pure strategies, since the action is now to choose the prob-
ability, not the action as before. This could be considered
an irrelevant distinction. However, it will prove to be useful
in our game theoretic model.
For behavior at an equilibrium to be considered rational,
it must not only be incentive compatible, meaning that no
player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from that
strategy, but it must also be individually rational. Individual
rationality means that each player is expected to be no worse
off than they were before they chose to participate in the
game. More formally, it means that the payoffs for each
player in the equilibrium have an expected value greater
than or equal to zero.
3.2 Cryptographic Primitives
In order to maintain the integrity of our databases, we will
need to employ some basic cryptographic primitives. We will
need to employ a scheme that allows the owner to make sure
that tuples he receives from the server are legitimate, and
were not added or altered by the server. We can use a sim-
ple message authentication code protocol known as HMAC
to do this. HMAC requires the use of cryptographic hash
functions.
A cryptographic hash function or one-way hash function is a
function mapping a large, potentially infinite, domain to a fi-
nite range. This function is simple to compute (taking poly-
nomial time), but is difficult to invert. Equivalently, we can
say that, for a cryptographic hash function f , it is difficult
to find an x and y such that x 6= y and f(x) = f(y). Exam-
ples of cryptographic hash functions include MD5, SHA-1,
and SHA-256.
The HMAC (Hashing Message Authentication Code) system
creates a keyed hash function from an existing cryptographic
hash function. Let m be the message we wish to create a
code for, and k be the key we wish to use. Let f be our
cryptographic hash function, and let its required input size
be n. If k has a length smaller than n, we pad k with zeroes
until it has size n. If k is larger, we let k be f(k) for the
purposes of calculating the HMAC function. We define the
HMAC function as follows:
HMAC(m, k) = f((k ⊕ outpad)||f(k ⊕ inpad)||m)
Where outpad and inpad are two constants which are the
length of f ’s block size (in practice, 0x5c...5c and 0x36...36,
respectively).
Given a message m and its HMAC value h, if we have the
key k, we can simply check to see if HMAC(m,k) matches
h. If it does, then the probability that the message is not
legitimate (i.e., fabricated or altered), is negligible.
4. THE MULTIPLE CLOUD CASE
We first consider the case where multiple cloud providers
exist, which do not collude. This means that the parties do
not exchange strategies, and do not exchange information.
We model the query verification process as a game. The
game has the following characteristics:
Players: Three players, the Data Owner(O), and two out-
sourced servers (S1 and S2).
Actions: The data owner begins the game by selecting a
probability α, and declares this probability to the servers.
He then sends the query (Q) to one of the two servers, with
equal probability. With probability α he also sends the
query to the other server. If server Si receives the query,
they then respond to the query with either Q(D), that is,
the query result on the database D, or Q′i(D) which is some
result other than Q(D). We apply the subscript i to Q′
to indicate that one player’s method of cheating is differ-
ent from the other players’ method of cheating. We denote
the honest action as h, and the cheating action as c. These
actions are depicted in figure 3.
Information: Data Owner O has given his database D to
S1 and S2, with an HMAC message authentication code ap-
pended to each tuple. Any message authentication scheme
would work here, but its purpose and only effect is that it
maintains the integrity of the data. This means that the
servers cannot alter any tuples and cannot add any tuples
without being detected. The players have entered into an
agreement (a contract) before the game, and the contents of
this contract are known to all players. The contract could
contain the probability α.
Payoffs: The owner recieves the information value of the
results received, given by Iv(Q), where Q is either Q(D) or
Q′i(D), minus the amount paid to the servers P (Q). The
servers recieve this payment, minus the cost of computing
the query, C(Q). For simplicity’s sake, we assume that both
outsourcing services have the same cost of computation and
receive the same payment for the query. The logic below
easily applies to the case where costs are different, but this
assumption simplifies the equations involved. These payoffs
are additionally adjusted by the aforementioned contract.
We assume that Iv(Q(D)) ≥ (1+α)P (Q) and P (Q) ≥ C(Q).
If this were not the case, then the game would not be in-
dividually rational without some outside subsidies (that is,
some player’s expected payout would be less than zero). In
essence, we want to ensure that the subscriber would want to
Figure 3: The Two-Cloud Query Verification System
pay (1+α)P (Q) to receive the result, and the cloud provider
would accept P (Q) for the computation. To do this, we
make sure that the value that the subscriber places on the
query is at least the expected payment, and the cost to the
cloud providers is no more than the amount they would be
paid. No one takes a loss on the transaction.
We now present two contracts, both of which provide sim-
ple solutions to the above game in which neither server has
incentive to cheat. The first is very simple and requires
no additional computation. The second is intuitively more
fair, and thus more likely to be accepted in a real world
scenario. Both contracts, however, would be accepted by
rational players.
Contract 1 If the owner asks for query responses from both
servers, and the results do not match, both servers pay a
penalty of F to the owner, and return the money paid for
the computation P (Q) as well.
Theorem 4.1 The above game with contract 1 has an indi-
vidually rational, incentive compatible equilibrium in which
the servers behave honestly.
Proof : Let C(Q′i) be the cost of computing Q
′
i for Si. Note
that, because S1 and S2 do not collude, S1 does not know
Q′2, and S2 does not know Q
′
1. The only function both know
for sure is Q. Without additional knowledge, we can assume
that the probability that Q′1(D) = Q
′
2(D) is negligible. For
a player to even consider returning Q′i instead of Q, we must
have C(Q′i) ≤ C(Q), since a player will not cheat if they do
not gain anything from it. We also assume that Iv(Q
′
i(D)) <
0 < Iv(Q(D)), since not only is the false result not what the
owner asked for, but also appears to be the true result if not
verified. If the wrong answer is believed to be correct, this
would lead to wrong decisions, and ultimately, financial loss,
on the part of the owner. Now, we can define the expected
payoffs to each player, where uP (x, y) is the expected utility
for player P when S1 takes action x and S2 takes action y.
Note that, in these equations and throughout the rest of the
paper, we omit the argument D from Q, since D is fixed.
We begin with O. If both players are honest (equation 1), O
recieves the value of the information gained from the query,
minus the expected payment for the calculation, 1+α times
P (Q). If one player is dishonest (equations 2 and 3), then
with probability α, O detects this and gets both the honest
and the dishonest result and the fine F from both players.
With probability 1 − α, he does not detect this, and gets
either the correct value or the incorrect value with equal
probability. In the event that both players cheat (equation
4), they are once again caught with probability α, but in
this case, when they are not caught, O receives only bogus
values. This results in the following equations:
uO(h, h) = Iv(Q(D))− (1 + α)P (Q) (1)
uO(h, c) = α(2F + Iv(Q) + Iv(Q
′
2)) (2)
+ (1− α)(1
2
(Iv(Q) + Iv(Q
′
2))− P (Q))
uO(c, h) = α(2F + Iv(Q) + Iv(Q
′
1)) (3)
+ (1− α)(1
2
(Iv(Q) + Iv(Q
′
1))− P (Q))
uO(c, c) = α(2F + Iv(Q
′
1) + Iv(Q
′
2)) (4)
+ (1− α)(1
2
(Iv(Q
′
1) + Iv(Q
′
2))− P (Q))
For the servers, if both servers are honest (equations 5 and
8), they receive the payment for the query, minus the cost of
the query, provided they are selected to perform the calcula-
tion. This selection probability is why the equations below
contain 1
2
. Otherwise, they gain nothing and lose nothing.
If one player is dishonest, that player (equations 7 and 10),
regardless of whether the other player is honest, with prob-
ability α is caught, and loses the fine F . With probability
1−α, the player is not caught, and gains the payment P (Q),
minus the cost of computing his cheat, C(Q′i), if he is chosen
for the computation. If a player is honest while the other
player is dishonest (equations 6 and 9), that player simi-
larly is punished with probability α, but invests a cost of
C(Q) instead of C(Q′i) in the computation. This gives us
the following equations:
uS1(h, h) =
1
2
(1 + α)(P (Q)− C(Q)) (5)
uS1(h, c) =
1
2
(1− α)(P (Q)− C(Q))− αF (6)
uS1(c, h) = uS1(c, c) =
1
2
(1− α)(P (Q)− C(Q′1))− αF
(7)
uS2(h, h) =
1
2
(1 + α)(P (Q)− C(Q)) (8)
uS2(c, h) =
1
2
(1− α)(P (Q)− C(Q))− αF (9)
uS2(h, c) = uS1(c, c) =
1
2
(1− α)(P (Q)− C(Q′2))− αF
(10)
We can now find the α for which the expected value for S1
is less when he cheats than when he is honest, assuming S2
is honest. By symmetry, this will be the same for S2. Thus,
we set:
1
2
(1− α)(P (Q)− C(Q′1))− αF ≤ 1
2
(1 + α)(P (Q)− C(Q))
Let H represent the quantity P (Q)−C(Q), and H ′ represent
the quantity P (Q)−C(Q′1). Distribute the (1+α) and (1−α)
to get:
1
2
(H ′)− α
2
(H ′)− αF ≤ 1
2
(H) +
α
2
(H)
Rearranging and combining terms, we get:
1
2
(C(Q)− C(Q′1)) ≤ αF + αP (Q)
+
α
2
(C(Q)− C(Q′1))
Let G represent the quantity C(Q) − C(Q′1), that is, the
amount the server would gain from cheating. Substituting
this in and factoring out an α, we get:
1
2
G ≤ α(F + P (Q) + 1
2
G)
Multiplying through by two, we get:
G ≤ α(2F + 2P (Q) +G)
And, solving for α,
G
2F + 2P (Q) +G
≤ α (11)
Since we can define F to be whatever we want in the con-
tract, we can make this minimum α value arbitrarily small.
If α is at least this much, then S1 (and by symmetry, S2)
has no incentive to cheat. If S2 is not honest, then S1 has
no incentive to be honest, but the payout is less for both
(much less, if F is large). Therefore, the best outcome is for
both players to behave honestly.
Now, we need to show that choosing α is incentive compati-
ble for O. Given that both players are honest, O’s utility is
given as:
uO(h, h) = Iv(Q(D))− (1 + α)P (Q)
Which, by our assumption, is greater than or equal to zero.
Thus, it is individually rational for O. If α is increased, it
merely decreases this value, so O has no incentive to increase
α. If we decrease α, then S1 and S2 will start cheating! This
leads to:
uO(c, c) = α(2F + Iv(Q
′
1) + Iv(Q
′
2))
+ (1− α)(1
2
(Iv(Q
′
1) + Iv(Q
′
2))− P (Q))
Now, since our α is less than our prescribed value in equa-
tion (11), F is bounded above by G
α
− 2P (Q)−G. Because
of this, as α tends to zero, the first term of the above equa-
tion decreases. The second term is negative (as Iv(Q
′
1) and
Iv(Q
′
2) are less than zero), and gets worse as α tends to zero.
Thus, if α is less than our prescribed value, O expects to lose
value from cheating. So, O has no incentive to deviate from
α = G
2F+2P (Q)+G
.
Now, in practice, O does not know G. Thus, he must choose
the smallest α that he knows he can use. Since P (Q) ≥
C(Q) ≥ G, O can choose α = P (Q)
2F+2P (Q)−P (Q) =
P (Q)
2F−P (Q) .
As this is both incentive compatible and individually ratio-
nal for all players, this contract creates the best possible
equilibrium where S1 and S2 do not cheat, and O pays only
(1 + α) times the price of a single computation (where α is
small).
Now, it might seem unfair to punish both players when only
one player cheats. The rational player would see the above
contract as completely fair, but humans are not always com-
pletely rational. Thus, we also briefly examine a contract
which identifies the cheater and punishes only the cheater.
Contract 2 If the owner asks for query responses from both
servers, and the results do not match, the owner performs
a potentially costly audit of the computation. Each server
whose result does not match the result given by the owner’s
process pays a fine F to the owner.
The audit process mentioned above could be done in sev-
eral ways. The simplest, although most expensive, of these
would be for the owner to retrieve all the data, then per-
form the query himself. Obviously, this defeats the purpose
of data outsourcing. Based on the fact that the outsourced
data uses some message authentication codes to keep the
data from being modified, we can improve this. First, for
selection queries, if one player fails any MAC checks, then
they are obviously cheating. If one player returns fewer re-
sults than the other, then they are also obviously cheating.
For aggregate queries, we can have each source return the
tuples which were selected for the aggregation process. We
can then check to see if the aggregate query result matches
the values returned by the server. Finding a tuple set that
matches a false query result might prove incredibly difficult,
if the false query was not generated from a sample. We can
also apply the same techniques used for selection queries,
noting that the cloud that returns fewer tuples must be
cheating (provided all tuples returned are authenticated).
Essentially, for a given query, we end up asking the clouds
to “show their work,” or face consequences.
Theorem 4.2 The above game under contract 2 also has
an equilibrium where both servers remain honest.
Proof : The main differences between this and the previous
scenario are the fact that an honest server will never pay a
fine, and that if a player is caught cheating, the owner must
perform a costly audit. We will call this cost C(QO(D)).
As the data is signed with the HMAC codes, the owner can
retrieve all of it from either server, guaranteed. As uS1(h, h)
and uS1(c, h) do not change, the α may be located in the
same way. When one player cheats, the other player has
incentive to be honest, as it avoids the fine. Thus, (h, h)
is actually a dominant strategy in this game, when α is set
high enough. Now, recall that F can be set as high as nec-
essary. If we double F and increase it by the cost of the
audit C(QO(D)), then the payouts for O would be the same
as in contract 1. So, by Theorem 4.1, this is also incentive
compatible for O.
As this is both incentive compatible and individually ratio-
nal for all players, this contract creates the best possible
equilibrium where S1 and S2 do not cheat, and O pays only
(1 + α) times the price of a single computation (where α
is small). Note that, since both S1 and S2 are honest, we
never expect to pay the cost of the audit.
Note the generality of this result. In contrast with many
other results, it works for any query on any database
(with the caveat that the query is deterministic), and it
works in only one round of computation.
5. THE SINGLE CLOUD CASE
Though the above scenario is quite simple and very efficient,
it does require giving both money and data to multiple par-
ties. It might be that the cost of maintaining two cloud
services (due to storage costs and other overhead) is pro-
hibitively expensive. A data owner might also want to min-
imize the outside exposure of his data set. It is possible,
then, to use a similar scheme to verify the result from a sin-
gle cloud. For the single cloud case, we focus on a database
with a single relation. The extension to include joins will be
considered in future work. We once again cast the process
of query verification as a game. The game has the following
characteristics:
Players: Two players, the Data Owner (O) and the out-
sourced Server(S).
Actions: The data owner begins the game by selecting a
probability α, and declares this probability to the server.
This probability α is the probability with which the result
of the query (Q) will be verified (v). With probability 1 −
α, the query will not be verified (n). After receiving this
probability, the server may choose to cheat (c), revealing
q′S = Q
′(R), an incorrect result, or honestly (h) give the
result qS = Q(R). The data owner then verifies with the
probability α, first by performing a local evaluation, then, if
necessary, a full query audit.
Information: O has given his database relation (R) to S,
along with authenication codes for each tuple (to prevent
modification). O retains a sketch of the database (R′) which
will be used for verification. O has a process V (Q, q) which
determines whether the argument q is equal to qS with high
probability, using the sketch R′. In addition, an auditing
method existsA(Q, q,R) which will determine with certainty
whether the query was executed correctly, but is very ex-
pensive. The players have entered into a contract before
the game, and the contents of the contract are known to all
players. This contract can adjust the payoffs below.
Payoffs: Let ptp be the probability that V (Q, qS) returns
true, ptn be the probability that V (Q, q
′
S) returns false,
pfp = 1 − ptn, and pfn = 1 − ptp (These are the proba-
bilities of true positives, true negatives, false positives and
false negatives from V , respectively). Let C(X) be the cost
of computing the expression X. Let Iv(X) be the value of
the information given by X. The expected utilities (pay-
offs) for each player, without the intervening contract, are
as follows:
When the owner decides not to verify, he simply receives the
Figure 4: Verifying Queries With a Single Cloud
value of the query result (honest or not), minus the amount
paid for the calculation, resulting in:
uO(n, h) = Iv(qS)− P (Q)
uO(n, c) = Iv(q
′
S)− P (Q)
Similarly, the server simply gains the amount paid, minus
the cost of the calculation:
uS(n, h) = P (Q)− C(qS)
uS(n, c) = P (Q)− C(q′S)
If the owner chooses to verify, he also pays the cost of veri-
fication, and in the case of a failed V , also pays the cost of
an audit. If the audit fails (which would only happen in the
case of a cheating server), he does not pay the price for the
calculation.
uO(v, h) = Iv(qS)− P (Q)− C(V (Q, qS))
− pfn · C(A(Q, qS , R))
uO(v, c) = Iv(Q
′(R))− C(V (Q, q′S))
− ptn · C(A(Q, q′S , R))− pfp · P (Q)
An honest server, in the case of the verification, gets the
same payout he would without verification. This is the price
of the query minus the cost to calculate it. A cheating server
is only paid if he is not caught, so he is only paid in the case
of a false positive from V .
uS(v, h) = P (Q)− C(qS)
uS(v, c) = pfp · P (Q)− C(q′S)
Now, since O declares a verification probability in advance,
we can write the above as:
uO(α, h) = αuO(v, h) + (1− α)uO(n, h)
uS(α, h) = αuS(v, h) + (1− α)uS(n, h)
uO(α, c) = αuO(v, c) + (1− α)uO(n, c)
uS(α, c) = αuS(v, c) + (1− α)uS(n, c)
Note that, in practice, a payment might not be rendered
for every query, and instead the server might charge a flat
fee for its services, or some other payment structure. In
these cases, one could consider the total payments spread
out throughout the queries. This assumption that payment
is rendered for each query will not invalidate our solution.
We make some assumptions about the values used above.
First, we assume that Iv(qS) ≥ P (Q) ≥ C(qS). This is
because this inequality is necessary for participation in the
game to be individually rational (since this guarantees that
the best expected payoff for each player, assuming no one
cheats, is at least zero). Naturally, if the query were not
worth enough to the owner, he would not pay the price, and
if the price did not cover the cost of computation for the
server, he would not perform the calculation. Second, we
assume that as q′S approaches qS , C(q
′
S) approaches C(qS).
This implies that it is difficult to compute a q′S such that
V (Q, q′S) is expectedly true. As q
′
S moves away from qS , the
cost can decrease. This provides the initial incentive for the
server to cheat. These assumptions are logical, since com-
puting a value close to actual result becomes more and more
like computing the actual result. For example, if a cheat-
ing server were to run the query on a sample of the data
and extrapolate the result, the estimated result would get
more accurate as the sample size got larger, but the compu-
tational resources used would also increase. We assume that
the cost of V and A are constant for a given Q (no matter
if qS or q
′
S is provided to them as an argument). Finally,
we once again assume that Iv(q
′
S) < 0 < Iv(qS), due to the
result not being what O asked for. We also assume that
C(A(Q, q′S , R)) < Iv(qS) − Iv(q′S), since if the audit were
more costly than the amount of information supplied by the
query, the audit would not take place.
We now outline a contract which removes the incentive for
the server to cheat. It is quite similar to the contract for the
two-cloud case.
Contract 3 If the owner chooses to verify, and it is deter-
mined that the server has cheated, the server pays a penalty
of F +C(A(Q, q′S , R)). (Note: We explicitly force a cheating
server to pay the audit cost.)
Theorem 5 The game, using the above contract (depicted
in figure 4), has an equilibrium in pure strategies. O will
select an α which makes cheating less profitable (expectedly)
than correctly revealing the result. S chooses not to cheat.
Proof : The above contract makes the following changes to
the original utilities:
uO(v, c) = Iv(q
′
S)− C(V (Q, q′S))
−ptn · F − pfp · P (Q)
uS(v, c) = pfp · P (Q)− C(q′S)
−ptn · (C(A(Q, q′S , R)) + F )
Recall that the expected payouts payouts are:
uO(α, h) = αuO(v, h) + (1− α)uO(n, h)
uS(α, h) = αuS(v, h) + (1− α)uS(n, h)
uO(α, c) = αuO(v, c) + (1− α)uO(n, c)
uS(α, c) = αuS(v, c) + (1− α)uS(n, c)
We want to find the α such that uS(α, h) ≥ uS(α, c).
Substituting in, we get:
uS(α, h) = α(P (Q)− C(qS))
+(1− α)(P (Q)− C(qS))
= P (Q)− C(qS)
uS(α, c) = α(pfpP (Q)− C(q′S)
−ptn(C(A(Q, q′S , R)) + F ))
+(1− α)(P (Q)− C(q′S))
So, we have the inequality (after multiplying through by α
and 1− α:
P (Q)− C(qS) ≥ αpfpP (Q)− αC(q′S)
−αptn(C(A(Q, q′S , R)) + F )
+P (Q)− C(q′S)− αP (Q)
+αC(q′S)
Rearranging terms, we get:
P (Q)− P (Q) + C(q′S)− C(qS) ≥ α(pfpP (Q)− C(q′S)
− ptn(C(A(Q, q′S , R)) + F )
− P (Q) + C(q′S))
Canceling out like terms, we get:
C(q′S)− C(qS) ≥ α(pfp − 1)P (Q)
− αptn(C(A(Q, q′S , R)) + F )
Now, since Q′ is easier to compute than Q, pfp < 1, both
sides of this inequality are negative. We therefore multiply
both sides by −1 and simplify to get the following:
C(qS)− C(q′S) ≤ α((1− pfp)P (Q)
+ ptn(C(A(Q, q
′
S , R)) + F ))
Since 1− pfp is equal to ptn, we can substitute in ptn, then
divide by the coefficient of α, yielding the final expression:
α ≥ C(qS)− C(q
′
S)
ptn(C(A(Q, q′S , R)) + F + P (Q))
When α increases, the payout for cheating decreases, pro-
vided C(A(Q, q′S , R)) and F are large enough. So, as long as
the expression above is satisfied, the server will choose not
to cheat.
Now, while C(A(Q, q′S , R)) is fixed, F is something that can
be adjusted in the contract! Therefore, if the penalty F is
astronomically high, we can severely reduce α, while main-
taining that there is no incentive to cheat for S. This is
what is known as a “boiling-in-oil” contract [15].
We must also show that this α is incentive compatible for
O. Consider what happens when α is increased. If α is
greater than the above value, O ends up verifying more,
while S continues telling the truth. Because of this, O loses
valuation. So, O will not choose α higher than this. If α is
less than this value, then S will start cheating! The possible
increase in payout to O would be αF , but since α is small,
and Iv(qS) is so much greater than Iv(q
′
S), this would likely
result in a decrease in payout for O. Therefore, α is not
less than the above expression either. Thus, we have an
equilibrium.
6. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
The game outlined above is fairly general, and allows for any
local verification method V to be used. Here, we outline a
simple sampling verification method which becomes much
more viable when the verification process is not being run
with every query. First, let us assume that the data consists
of N signed tuples, each of which has a unique, consecutive
id from 1 to N . Let O maintain some sample of size k of
these N tuples, together with the value N . This sample is
selected uniformly at random from the entire data set, with
replacement. This sample can be used to compute V (Q, q′S)
for many different types of queries. For aggregate queries
such as count, sum, average, standard deviation, etc, one
could simply perform the action on the k tuples, and ex-
trapolate based on N . If this sample value is within some
ε of the query result q′S , then we declare the result correct.
Otherwise, we perform the audit.
For selection queries, note that because each tuple is signed,
we know that the server cannot modify any tuples, nor can it
insert new tuples. It can only either remove relevant tuples
from the result, or insert irrelevant tuples into the result. If
the server inserts irrelevant tuples, this can be easily verified
by O by simply noting that the tuple does not match the
query. Thus, it is only difficult to verify when a tuple has
been left out. As before, we can perform the selection query
on the sample of k tuples, and extrapolate the number of
tuples that should be returned by qS . If the number of
tuples in q′S is within some ε, we declare the result correct.
If the number of tuples in q′S is greater than our estimate,
then we should also declare the result correct, since a greater
number of tuples cannot be wrong. Otherwise, we perform
the audit.
There are plenty of other methods used to verify queries on
outsourced data, and any of them would work as a verifica-
tion method V in our scheme. We choose this one, however,
because of its simplicity. Note that it does not require ex-
pensive cryptographic operations.
One thing remains in the definition of the verification mech-
anism, and that is the definition of ε. As the selection of k
tuples can be considered a selection of k random variables
X1, ..., Xk ∈ R, and in each case we are interested in a func-
tion f which maps R → <, and any alteration in a given
Xi can only change the value of the aggregate function by
at most some ci (this ci is 1 for count, the max value of
the given attribute for sum, the max value squared for stan-
dard deviation, etc), we can apply McDiarmid’s inequality
[9], giving us the following:
Pr{|E[f(X1, ..., Xk)]− f(X1, ..., Xk)| ≥ ε} ≤ 2e
− 22∑k
i=1
c2
i
Note, this inequality does not depend on the value of N .
It simply depends on the sample size. For example, say
we want to devise a sample size k such that the probabil-
ity that an average query on attribute a of the sample is
within ε = 1% of the true result with probability .999. ci is
given as max{|a|}
k
. The probability in the above works out
to 2e
− .0002average{a}
2
max{|a|}2/k . We want this to be less than or equal
to .001. Solving for k, we get
ln(.0005) ≤ − .0002average{a}
2k
max{|a|}2
−ln(.0005)max{|a|}2
.0002average{a}2 ≤ k
This gives us a k value of approximately 38004.51 times the
maximum value of the attribute a, divided by the square of
the result. As the average of the result is no more than the
maximum value of a, but its square can be much larger, k can
be 38 thousand tuples, or less, depending on the distribution
of a, even if the number of tuples is in the millions. Note
that this is does not help the data owner find the value of k,
as the owner does not know the actual result. This merely
shows that a good k exists, and it is independent of the
number of tuples in the dataset for many common queries.
38,000 tuples is not a particularly small number, especially
with some sketches using only three bytes [21]. However,
this sample can be used to verify many different types of
queries, and does not have to plan for the queries in advance.
In addition, the verification will only be performed a fraction
(α) of the time. This fraction, through the use of the penalty
in the contract, can be made arbitrarily small, leading to a
very fast expected runtime.
Now, one method of generating a false query (for aggre-
gate queries) might be to use the same sampling method as
above. Note, however, that in order to ensure that the sam-
ple chosen by the server has a result within ε of the result
of the owner’s sample, the server would need a much tighter
epsilon.
With some probability δ, the owner’s sample result is within
ε of the correct result. This is also true for the server. How-
ever, consider the worst case where the owner’s sample value
is Q(R)− ε and the server’s sample value is Q(R) + ε. The
probability δ is not sufficient to bound the difference between
the two sample values. To ensure that with probability δ the
owner’s sample result is within ε of the result returned by
the server (with the given high probability), the server would
have to return the actual result, as any leeway would lead
to a worst case scenario where the difference is greater than
ε.
In order to prevent sampling bias, a protocol could be im-
plemented to resample from the data. As each tuple has
a unique id, the owner could, at some interval, request the
tuples with a given set of ids. The owner would know if the
tuples he desired were not returned. In order to prevent the
server from learning the exact sample (which would lead to
the server simply using that sample for calculations), the
owner would select some dummy tuples, or in some cases,
the entire data set. A similar method, selecting all tuples
involved, can be employed for auditing the queries.
7. EXPERIMENTS
To test the effectiveness of the sampling protocol for catch-
ing cheating on real data, we ran a series of experiments.
The mechanisms outlined in sections 4 and 5 do not need
any experimentation, as they are proven and mathematically
sound. These experiments were designed to show that the
sampling technique can identify cheating with a non-trivial
probability. Other verification methods will work similarly
in our framework, as long as they can identify cheating with
non-trivial probability. For example, if a simple method ex-
ists to verify a certain query deterministically, then it could
be called in place of our sampling scheme, and would allow
our α to be even smaller. The sampling protocol is impor-
tant, however, due to its generality and simplicity.
7.1 Methodology
We used the US Census 1990 data set from the UC Irvine
Machine Learning repository, which contains over 2.3 million
tuples [1]. We focused on a few major fields in this data set.
We processed results for eight different aggregation queries
of varying types. Since selection queries can be estimated
via counts, we chose to focus on aggregation queries.
The query types are as follows:
1. Count, equality selection (count the people whose race
value is 2–black)
2. Count, range selection (count the people whose income
is greater than 40000)
3. Count, range and equality conjunction (count the peo-
ple who are over age 30 and never married)
4. Count, range disjunction (count the people who are
under age 18 or have an income of less than 10000)
5. Sum, equality selection (find the sum of the incomes
of all people who never married)
6. Sum, range and equality conjunction (find the sum
of the incomes of all people who are over age 40 and
whose place of birth is the place they work)
7. Average, range selection (find the average age of all
people who have an income greater than 80000)
8. Average, equality conjunction, sparse result (find the
average income of all people who are male and of race
9–Japanese)
For each query, we ran 100 trials, estimating the full result
of the query with five different sample sizes: 1000 tuples,
5000 tuples, 10000 tuples, 20000 tuples, and 40000 tuples.
As above, these samples are selected uniformly at random
with replacement. We determined the likelihood that each
sample would accept the correct value for varying values of
ε from 0 to .5r where r is the estimated result. Since the
verification process would not know the actual result, we
based the ε on the estimated result given by the sample, as
we expected it to be close to the actual result.
We then ran the samples against different means of falsifying
the result, to determine if the sample method could catch a
cheater. The first type of falsification was the same as our
verification technique, sampling the data. We once again
ran 100 trials for 1000, 5000, 10000, 20000, and 40000 tuple
samples, both for detecting the cheating and for creating the
cheating.
The second type of falsification was a “worst case” falsifica-
tion, where the exact result was computed, but then Laplace
noise was added to the final result. An adversary would
never actually do this, as it would be more expensive than
simply computing the result itself, but this provides a way to
test our scheme beyond the normal means. The mean of the
Laplace noise was of course the result itself (which we will
call r), whereas the width parameter was varied from r/5,
r/10, r/20, and r/50. We chose Laplace noise as opposed
to any other type of noise because it is used in differen-
tial privacy as a means of masking query results while still
achieving meaningful results [5]. Each of these sets of noise
ran 100 trials against each sample size as before.
7.2 Results
Space restrictions prevent the inclusion of every graph gener-
ated by the experiments. However, if we examine one factor
at a time, we can show the general trend of the sampling
protocol to correctly or incorrectly identify cheating values.
The omitted graphs show similar trends.
Query Type Figure 5 shows the ROC (receiver operating
characteristic) curves for each of the eight queries, for a sam-
ple size of 10000, against every type of result falsification we
used. These ROC curves shows the tradeoff between the
probability of a false negative and the probability of a true
negative. The queries themselves all behave similarly. At a
sample size of 10000, we can always find an ε where some
nontrivial fraction of cheating will be caught. There is al-
ways a tradeoff, however. As ε decreases, more legitimate
results will be marked as wrong, and forced to be fully au-
dited. Proper use of the sampling technique involves careful
selection of epsilon in order to increase ptn, while reducing
pfn as much as possible. In practice, it is more important
that ptn be high, since we can mitigate the effect of false pos-
itives by increasing the penalty, thereby decreasing α and
reducing the number of times that we do the verification.
ptn is acceptably high for fairly small  (0.00125r to 0.005r).
Sample Size Figure 6 shows the ROC curves for query 2 for
each sample size used. Clearly, as the sample size increases,
the potential for better choices of epsilon increases. With a
sample size of 40000, there is even a type of cheating (r/5
noise) that allows for a false negative rate of .02 and a true
negative rate of .95! The obvious tradeoff here, though, is
that while you will do fewer full audits with a larger sample
size, the verification process will take more resources. The
smaller sample sizes still have the ability to catch cheating,
but they will end up auditing many more legitimate results.
Cheater Sample Size Figure 7 shows the ROC curves
for query 3, against cheaters using sampling only. We can
clearly see that the curves move down and to the right as
our adversary’s sample size increases. This makes sense,
as the cheater gets better at impersonating the correct re-
sult, it becomes more difficult to distinguish the incorrect
results from the correct ones. However, in every case, even
with a sample size of 1000, we are able to detect cheating
better than random guessing. Keep in mind that, in order
to be useful, we merely need to be able to detect cheating
with some non-negligible probability, and that any means
we choose to do that is acceptable.
Cheater Laplace Noise Figure 8 shows the same query
as figure 7, but this time with our cheater only using the
Laplace noise. Surprisingly, the noise addition version ends
up being easier to catch. This is due to the fact that the
parameter on the Laplace noise is large enough to cause
issues. Still, at r/50, the cheating becomes quite difficult to
detect for low sample size.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, by thinking about the problem of query ver-
ification from a different perspective, namely, that of an
economist, we can drastically reduce the computation re-
quired to ensure that the result you asked for is the result
you received. The various query verification methods that
are out there are still quite useful, however. Specialized ver-
ification methods which take up very little space work well
for common queries, and in our game-theoretic framework,
would only be required to run a fraction of the time. They
are, however, not generic and can rely on some expensive
operations. No matter what sort of verification method we
choose, our contract-based computation vastly simplifies the
Query 1 Query 2 Query 3 Query 4
Query 5 Query 6 Query 7 Query 8
Figure 5: ROC Curves for the 8 Query Types: Sample Size 10000
Sample Size 1000 Sample Size 5000 Sample Size 10000
Sample Size 20000 Sample Size 40000
Figure 6: ROC Curves for Five Sample Sizes: Query 2
Sample Size 1000 Sample Size 5000 Sample Size 10000
Sample Size 20000 Sample Size 40000
Figure 7: ROC Curves for Five Sample Sizes: Query 3, Sampling Cheater Only
Sample Size 1000 Sample Size 5000 Sample Size 10000
Sample Size 20000 Sample Size 40000
Figure 8: ROC Curves for Five Sample Sizes: Query 3, Noisy Cheater Only
overall process of query verification.
8.1 Future Work
In the future, we will consider other types of verification
methods, and how they might be better served by the game-
theoretic framework outlined here. In addition, we will con-
sider joins, which are disproportionately resource intensive
compared to other database operations, possibly resulting
in a need for a revised incentive structure.
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